We consider ϵ-equilibria notions for a constant value of ϵ in n-player m-action games, where m is a constant. We focus on the following question: What is the largest grid size over the mixed strategies such that ϵ-equilibrium is guaranteed to exist over this grid.
INTRODUCTION
e algorithmic aspect of equilibria has been studied extensively from the moment the concept of Nash equilibrium was introduced [11] , and mainly in the past three decades [7, 9, 14, 15] . A naive approach for the computation of an approximate Nash equilibrium in normal form games is the following:
-Set a "dense enough grid" of the strategy pro les, such that an approximate Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist on this grid. -Exhaustively search over all grid points as to whether they form an approximate Nash equilibrium.
Despite the extensive study of equilibrium computation and the naivety of the above algorithm, no be er algorithm is known (except for special classes of games, e.g. [8] ). Surprisingly, the above algorithm is known to be optimal for games with a constant number of players (under the exponential time hypothesis for the PPAD class), see [15] . We show an additional case where this algorithm is optimal (see Corollary 3.2) . is motivates the study of the question: How dense should the grid of the strategy pro les be in order to guarantee the existence of an approximate equilibrium over the grid. A standard notion that captures the grid's density is the following.
De nition 1.1. A probability distribution µ ∈ ∆(B) is called k-uniform if it is uniformly distributed over a multi-set of B of size k, or equivalently, if for every b ∈ B we have µ(b) = 1 Itai Arieli and Yakov Babichenko e class of grids (over the mixed strategies) that is considered in the present paper is the class of k-uniform distributions, and its density is determined by k. e larger the k is, the denser the grid.
e main question of the present paper can be formulated as follows: estion 1: Given an ϵ-equilibrium solution concept, for which values of k = k(ϵ, n, m) is the existence of k-uniform ϵ-equilibrium guaranteed for every n-player m-action game? More concretely, we will be interested in understanding the asymptotic behaviour of lim n→∞ k(ϵ, n, m) when we set m and ϵ as xed constants.
e dependence of k = k(ϵ, n, m) on the number of actions m has a neat characterization of k = Θ(log m) [1, 12] . However, the dependence on the number of players n is less understood: It is known that the dependence is at most O(log n) (see [2] ), but no lower bounds were known (neither for Nash equilibria nor for correlated equilibria). e present paper aims to close these gaps. e established results have implications to equilibria computation, and to the rate of convergence of learning dynamics.
Weak equilibria
Unlike standard notions of equilibria that require rationality from all players, in weak equilibria, rationality is required for large fraction (close to 1) of the players.
is solution concept has been shown to be useful for proving lower bounds for the standard notion of(approximate) Nash equilibrium (see [3, 15] ). e concept of weak equilibria arises naturallyin evolutionary systems with mutations. In such a system, if we refer to each gene as a player, it is unreasonable to require that all players will react optimally to the environment,simply because at each point in time the system contains mutants whose action might be suboptimal. In this se ing, the notion of weak equilibria which allows to a small fraction of mutants to act suboptimally is more appropriate. In fact, for any dynamical system where players have a positive probability of error (either due to mutations, trembling hand principle, or due to any other reason) the more suitable notion of equilibrium is that of a weak equilibrium.
Our positive results, as described below, show that the required grid size is small for notions of weak approximate equilibria.
Main results
1.2.1 Approximate Nash equilibria. Here, by a k-uniform approximate Nash equilibrium we refer to an action pro le where every player uses a k-uniform strategy. e best known upper bound for ϵ-Nash equilibrium is k = O(log n), see [2] .
e question as to whether k = O(1) su ces is an interesting open question and we address it here. In eorem 3.1 we prove that for a weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a strategy pro le where most of the players are approximately best-replying (see De nition 2.2 and also [3] ), indeed k = O(1) su ces. is result implies a polynomial (in the input) algorithm for computing a weak approximate Nash equilibrium. To the best of our knowledge, no previous results have demonstrated the existence of a polynomial algorithm for any approximate notion of a Nash equilibrium in normal form games. It is interesting to note that the query complexity of a weak approximate Nash equilibrium is polynomial (in the input), [15] . us, a sub-polynomial algorithm for a weak approximate equilibrium is impossible. Hence, again, as in the two-player case, the naive exhaustive search algorithm is proved to be optimal.
Unfortunately, we did not manage to prove or disprove whether k = O(1) su ces for the standard notion of ϵ-Nash equilibrium (or for the notion of ϵ-well supported Nash equilibrium). However, we do gain some insights into a closely-related question: Does there exist an approximate Nash equilibrium on the grid that is "close to" an exact Nash equilibrium?
A natural approach to prove the existence of an approximate equilibrium is to search for one that lies nearby an exact Nash equilibrium. More concretely, consider a binary-action game (m = 2) with an exact Nash equilibrium x = (x i ) i ∈[n] ∈ [0, 1] n , where x i is the probability of playing the rst action. Say that
For which values of k is it guaranteed that for every game there exists an exact equilibrium x such that some 1 k -rounding of x constitute an ϵ-Nash equilibrium? In Proposition 4.1 we show that for k = O( log n) there exists a binary action game with a unique Nash equilibrium x such that all of the 1 k -rounding of x are not approximate Nash equilibria. Moreover, all approximate Nash equilibria in the grid (although they exist) are located "very far" from the equilibrium: ere exist players who play a certain pure strategy in the exact equilibrium and the opposite strategy in any approximate well supported Nash equilibrium on the grid. Proposition 4.1 demonstrates that nding a close approximate equilibrium for k = O(1) is impossible in general. For particular classes of games such as degree d graphical games, it is easy to see that every rounding of exact equilibrium to the 1 k -grid forms an ϵ-Nash equilibrium for
. We can therefore ask whether ϵ-equilibrium which is 1 k -rounding of an exact equilibrium exists in some particular classes of games.
An interesting observation is that for some classes of games the answer to the above question is (probably) mathematically very challenging. We introduce a class of games for which this question is equivalent 1 to the well known Beck-Fiala conjecture (since 1981) in discrepancy theory [4, 6, 13] , see eorem 4.5. To the best of our knowledge eorem 4.5 is the rst result that establishes a connection between game theory and discrepancy theory.
Approximate correlated equilibria.
Since a correlated equilibrium is a distribution over the action pro les, here a k-uniform distribution means a uniform distribution over k action pro les.
A k = O(log n) upper bound was proved to be su cient for the existence of ϵ-correlated equilibrium, see [2] . In fact, regret minimizing algorithms converge to an ϵ-correlated equilibrium in a rate of O(log n) [5, 10] . is provides an alternative proof for the existence of such a k-uniform approximate correlated equilibrium. In eorem 5.1 we prove a lower bound of k = Ω(log n). Our result shows that no dynamic can converge to an approximate correlated equilibrium faster than in Ω(log n) steps, which shows the optimality in the rate of convergence of the regret minimizing dynamics. We note that it was known that regret minimizing dynamics cannot converge faster than in Ω(log n) steps. Our result shows that no dynamic at all can converge faster.
In Proposition 5.3 we note that if we restrict a ention to the notion of weak approximate correlated equilibrium: i.e., a distribution over the pro les such that most of the players have low regret (see De nition 2.5), then there exists a k-uniform weak approximate correlated equilibrium for k = O(1). is observation demonstrates that, similarly to the product distribution solutions (Nash equilibrium), also in correlated solutions (correlated equilibrium) once we restrict a ention to weak approximate solutions, the solution becomes simple with respect to the grid size; i.e., grid size of Ω(1) su ces. Given a pro le of (mixed) actions x = (x i ) we denote by x −i the pro le of actions of player i's opponents, namely
De nition 2.1. Approximate Nash equilibrium. A pro le of mixed actions
is an ϵ-Nash equilibrium if no player can gain more than ϵ by a unilateral deviation. Namely,
De nition 2.2. Weak approximate Nash equilibrium. A pro le of mixed actions
is an (ϵ, δ )-weak approximate Nash equilibrium if at least (1 − δ )-fraction of the players cannot gain more than ϵ by a unilateral deviation.
De nition 2.3. (Approximately) Individually rational payo s. e individually rational level of player i is the maximal number i that he can guarantee (using mixed strategies) against any action of the opponents. Namely,
ere are several notions of correlated equilibria and approximate correlated equilibria. Arguably the strongest notion of an approximate correlated equilibrium is the following. e intuition behind this notion comes from the idea that a correlated strategy x can be implemented by a mediator who draws an action pro le a = (a i ) i ∈[n] according to x and recommends every player i to use a i . If no player can gain more than ϵ by deviating from mediator's recommendation (namely to play action f (j) every time mediator recommends j) then the distribution x is an ϵ-correlated equilibrium.
De nition 2.4. Approximate correlated equilibrium.
Approximate correlated equilibrium also has a weak analogue of the solution.
De nition 2.5. Weak approximate correlated equilibrium. We would like to note that ϵ-individual rationality is the weakest possible notion for solutions that require rationality from all players (unlike the weak approximate correlated equilibrium for instance). In particular the set of approximately individually rational distributions contains the set of approximate correlated equilibria and approximate coarse correlated equilibria.
WEAK APPROXIMATE NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Our main positive result is the following. T 3.1. Every n-player m-action game admits a k-uniform (ϵ, δ )-weak approximate Nash equilibrium for every k ≥ 32(ln 8+ln m−ln ϵ −ln δ ) ϵ 2
.
e important property of the bound on k is the fact that it does not depend on n. A straightforward corollary from eorem 3.1 is the existence of a polynomial algorithm for a weak approximate equilibrium. C 3.2. For every ϵ, δ > 0 and every m ∈ N there exists a pol (N ) algorithm that computes an (ϵ, δ )-weak approximate Nash equilibrium in every n-player m-action game, where N = n · m n is the input size (the size of the game).
2. e algorithm exhaustively searches for an (ϵ, δ )-weak approximate Nash equilibrium over all the k-uniform pro les, for k =
e number of kuniform mixed actions of a single player is bounded by k m . us, the number of k-uniform action pro les is bounded by
Note that the algorithm is guaranteed to nd an (ϵ, δ )-weak approximate Nash equilibrium by eorem 3.1.
e proof of eorem 3.1 uses a similar technique to the one developed in [2] . We prove that a er a constant number of samples from an exact Nash equilibrium distribution, with positive probability, the sampled mixed action pro le forms an (ϵ, δ )-weak approximate Nash equilibrium. We rely on the following concentration inequality for product distributions that was derived in [2] .
Given a discrete probability space (Ω, µ) we denote by µ (k ) ∈ ∆(Ω) the random distribution that is obtained by taking the average of k i.i.d. samples from µ. Namely, µ 1 ) , ..., (Ω n , µ n ) be discrete probability spaces. Consider the product
be a Nash equilibrium of the game. We denote
the mixed action of player i that is obtained by sampling k i.i.d. draws from x i . Se ing f = u i andε = ϵ 2 in eorem 3.3 implies that
for every player i ∈ [n] and every action a i ∈ [m]. e choice of k guarantees that
Using the union bound, we get that for every player i with probability greater than 1 − δ we have Session
the event i is a su cient condition for player i to ϵ-best reply at the pro le (s k i ) i , because
Since each one of the events i happens with probability of at least 1 − δ there exists a realization (s k i ) i such that at least (1 − δ )-fraction of the events i happen. Such a realization (s k i ) i is an (ϵ, δ )-weak approximate Nash equilibrium.
APPROXIMATE NASH EQUILIBRIUM
We recall that given an equilibrium x and an integer k we de ne a 1 k -rounding of x to be any point in the k-grid of the simplex of mixed strategies for which |x i − i | ≤ 1 k for every player i. P 4.1. ere exists an n-player binary-action game with a unique exact Nash equilibrium
there is no 0.1-Nash equilibrium that is , and we call them the observing players. Player S has to guess whether the number of players that will play 1 in S is close to b 2 . More formally, player S has two strategies 0 and 1. His utility is given by u(0, a S ) = 0.5 (independently of a S ),
e unique exact equilibrium of this game is where all matching-pennies players are playing (
2 ) and all the observing players are playing 1. e la er follows from the fact that the number of 1's is distributed according to a binomial distribution Bin(b, . ere exists a set S such that either every player i ∈ S plays a mixed strategy x i > 1 2 or every player i ∈ S plays x i < 1 2 . W.l.o.g., assume that the la er happens. Note that the amount of 1's for this speci c set S is a distribution with expectation of at least µ ≥ b( √ b] is at most Φ(−2) < 0.03. erefore player S must play 1 with probability of at most 0.1 0.47 < 0.22 in a 0.1-Nash equilibrium, which is far from his pure strategy 1 in the exact equilibrium.
To conclude, the total number of players in the game is n = 2b + 2b b ≤ 2 2b , and for an odd grid of
all approximate equilibria on the grid are far from the unique exact equilibrium.
The connection to discrepancy theory
e basic question that is considered in discrepancy theory is the following: Given a 0, 1 matrix M of size n × m, how close to 0 can one make the sum of (all) rows by multiplying every column by either 1 or −1. 3 More formally, de ne
e classical "Six standard deviations su ce" eorem by Spencer [16] states that for m ≥ n and for every matrix M we have disc(M) ≤ 6 √ n. For the case where the matrix is sparse namely each column contains at most t 1's Back and Fiala [4] conjectured that disc(M) = O( √ t) (independently of n and m) [4] .
A particular case of the Back-Fiala conjecture is the case of balanced matrices (up to a constant factor).
Given a matrix M ∈ {0, 1} n×m we denote ere is ample evidence showing that the α-balanced conjecture is not signi cantly simpler than the original conjecture, because for similar problems where tight lower bounds are known (for instance Spencer's eorem [16] ) the lower bounds satisfy balanceness.
e class of games that is considered, and that has close connection to discrepancy problems is majority matching-pennies games. A majority matching-pennies game is characterized by a matrix M ∈ {0, 1} n×m , and it consists of n + m players. Each row/column player has two actions {1, −1}, and he should decide whether to multiply all the elements in his row/column by −1. e utility of every row player is given by:
• 1 if the sum of numbers in his row is positive (a er we take into account his action and the actions of his column opponents).
• 0 if the sum of numbers in his row is 0.
• −1 if the sum of numbers in his row is negative. e utilities of every column player is the opposite of the row players:
• −1 if the sum of numbers in his row is positive.
• 1 if the sum of numbers in his row is negative.
We call these games majority matching-pennies since they are equivalent to a bipartite polymatrix game where row player i interacts with column player j in a matching-pennies game i M i, j = 1.
Unlike standard polymatrix games where players receive the sum of payo s, here players receive the sign of the sum of payo s.
Note that the pro le of actions where every player is playing (
2 ) is an exact equilibrium in every majority matching-pennies game.
A subclass of majority matching-pennies games is α-balanced majority matching-pennies games where the matrix M is α-balanced. C 4.4. Existence of close approximate equilibrium, for α-balanced games. ere exists a global constant k = k(α) such that one of the 2 n+m pro les of the form ( k ±1 2k ) n+m is a 0.4-Nash equilibrium.
Now we are ready to state the equivalence of approximate equilibria and the discrepancy result. Although eorem 4.5 demonstrates a connection between the Back-Fiala conjecture and a very speci c question on the approximation of equilibrium, we believe that the eorem provides interesting insights for the following reasons. First, as mentioned in the Introduction, it connects the two seemingly unrelated topics of game theory and discrepancy theory. Second, it suggests that the question of the existence of a k-uniform ϵ-Nash equilibrium for k = O(1) is probably quite involved.
ird, if one comes up with a proof of su ciency of k = O(1) for the existence of a k-uniform ϵ-Nash equilibrium in binary-action games, then it would be interesting to understand where this approximate Nash equilibrium in majority matching-pennies games is located. Informally, note that majority matching-pennies games have con icts of interest between the row players and the column players: row players want the matrix to increase the number of 1's whereas column players want to increase the number of (−1)'s. us it is reasonable to believe that the approximate Nash equilibrium will indeed be located "close to" (at least in the relative l 1 metric) the exact equilibrium ( 
Note that M T is also an α-balanced matrix; thus there exists also χ ∈ {−1, 1} n such that ||M T χ || ∞ ≤ C √ t. We set k = 3αC, and we argue that the pro le of actions where every column player j is playing k+χ j 2k , and every row player i is playing k +χ j 2k is a 0.4-Nash equilibrium. We prove that the rst row player cannot gain more than 1 3 by deviation. For other players the same arguments hold. Given that the rst row player is playing 1, we analyse the distribution S of the sum of elements in the rst row (given the mixed strategy of the column players). S is a sum of t Bernoulli ±1 variables for show that the rst row sums up to O( √ t). For every other row the same arguments hold. Note that the rst row player plays a mixed strategy in [0. 4, 0.6] . erefore, in a 0.4-Nash equilibrium he must be 1-indi erent between the two actions 1 and −1. As before, denote by S the sum of elements in the rst row in the 0.4-Nash equilibrium pro le, given that the rst row player is playing 1; 1-indi erence implies that 0.25 ≥ Pr (S ≥ 0) and 0.25 ≥ Pr (S ≥ 0). e variance of S is at most σ 2 ≤ αt. If µ > √ αt, then by the Central Limit eorem we get that Pr (S ≤ 0) ≤ 0.16 which is a contradiction. Similarly it is impossible that µ < − √ αt. erefore, |µ | < √ αt which implies that
CORRELATED DISTRIBUTIONS
We turn to our main negative result concerning correlated equilibria. Since every ϵ-correlated/coarse correlated equilibrium distribution is, in particular, ϵ-individually rational, the above lower bound holds for correlated and coarse correlated equilibria.
We recall that a dynamic is converging to an approximate correlated/coarse correlated equilibrium in t steps if the empirical distribution of play forms an approximate correlated/coarse correlated equilibrium (with high probability).
No dynamic converges to an approximate correlated/coarse correlated equilibrium faster than in Ω(log n).
e corollary simply follows from the fact that no empirical distribution of size smaller than Ω(log n) can form an approximate correlated/coarse correlated equilibrium in the game that is described in eorem 5.1. On the other hand, it is known that regret minimizing dynamics converge to approximate correlated/coarse correlated equilibrium in O(log n) steps, see [5, 10] . us, Θ(log n) is the fastest possible rate of convergence of dynamics to approximate correlated correlated/ coarse correlated equilibrium and regret minimizing dynamics achieve this bound. P T 5.1. For two vectors x, ∈ {0, 1} k we denote x ⊕ = (x + ) mod 2 ∈ {0, 1} k .
For every k ∈ N we consider a game with n = (2 k − 1)2 (2 k −1 ) players. Players are denoted by (s, p) where 0 s ∈ {0, 1} k and p ∈ {0, 1} (2 k −1 ) . We identify a player with a pair (s, V ) where V ⊂ {0, 1} k is a subset of size |V | = 1 2 2 k as follows: note that s de nes a matching over {0, 1} k where x is matched with x(x ⊕ s). e matching has 2 k −1 matched pairs. e vector p indicates which one of the two vectors (x or (x ⊕ s)) belongs to the subset V .
Each player has a binary action set {0, 1}. We de ne a mapping f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} k which assigns a k-dimensional binary vector for each action pro le in the game:
s. Now we de ne the utility of player (s, p), or equivalently player (s, V ) to be
Note that any unilateral divination of a single player at any action pro le switches his utility from 0 to 1, or from 1 to 0. Formally, for every player (s , p ) (or equivalently (s , V )) and every 
Similarly, u (s ,p ) (0, a −(s ,p ) ) = 1 implies that u (s ,p ) (1, a −(s ,p ) ) = 0. erefore, each player can guarantee a payo of We should show that for every distribution µ ∈ ∆({0, 1} n ) with support of at most e distribution µ ∈ ∆({0, 1} n ) induces a distribution ν = f (µ) ∈ ∆({0, 1} k ). e support of ν remains to be at most 1 4 2 k . We apply the probabilistic method to nd a player with low payo . We choose a vector x at random according to ν, and we choose a vector s (independently) uniformly at random from {0, 1} k . Note that for every xed vector x, the vector x ⊕ s is distributed uniformly at random; therefore Pr x,s (x ⊕ s support(ν)) ≥ 4 . Consider the matching of {0, 1} k that is obtained by the vector s . We set the vector p as follows: For a matched pair x ↔ x ⊕ s where x ∈ support(ν) and x ⊕ s support(ν) we set x ⊕ s ∈ V (and thus x V ). For all other pairs we set the choice of p arbitrarily. By de nition, the payo of player (s , p ) can be expressed as u i (µ) = Pr x ∼ν (x ∈ V ), but we have set V in a way that guarantees Pr x ∼ν (x ∈ V ) ≤ In contrast to an approximate correlated equilibrium which requires the support of size k = Ω(log n), for the weaker notion of a weak approximate correlated equilibrium where we allow a small constant fraction of players to have an arbitrary regret, existence of a k-uniform weak approximate equilibrium is guaranteed for k = O(1). e proof is similar to the proof of eorem 5 in [2] . eorem 5 in [2] shows that a er k = O(log n) samples from an exact correlated equilibrium all players will have low regret (w.h.p). Here we observe that a er k = O(1) samples most of the players will have low regret (w.h.p).
S
. We draw k samples from an exact correlated equilibrium, and we consider the regret of a single player i for not using the switching rule f : [m] → [m] (namely, every time player i was recommended to play action j he switches to f (j)). e probability that this regret will exceed ϵ is e −Θ( . Denote by i the event where for player i the regret is below ϵ for all switching rules. By the union bound Pr .
erefore, there exists a realization for which at least 1 − m m e −Θ( 
